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INTRODUCTION

The Louisiana Mineral Code has much to offer common law jurisdictions
that seek to more completely define the oil and gas property interest. As
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common law courts grapple with cross-boundary intra-reservoir conflicts,
such as hydraulic fracturing (“frac”) fissures that cross subterranean
property lines, the Louisiana Civil Code provides useful guidance on how
to be “neighborly”1 while the Mineral Code reminds us that reservoir
rights are “correlative.”2 These Code provisions provide accurate and
useful reminders about the scope of “ownership” within an oil and gas
reservoir.3 As is often the case, the Code provisions also provide guidance
for how common law jurisdictions might better address oil and gas issues.4
In typical elegant fashion, the Mineral Code states: “Landowners and
others with rights in a common reservoir or deposit of minerals have
correlative rights and duties with respect to one another in the development
and production of the common source of minerals.”5 In the past, most of the
focus has been on “rights and duties” that place limitations on what an owner
can do within the reservoir: negative rights.6 This Article explores the
1. LA. C IV. CODE art. 667 (2015) (“Although a proprietor may do with his
estate whatever he pleases, still he cannot make any work on it, which may deprive
his neighbor of the liberty of enjoying his own, or which may be the cause of any
damage to him.”); see also LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:10 & cmt (2000)
(describing Article 10 as “a limited restatement of the obligation of good
neighborhood contained in Article 667 of Louisiana Civil Code”). Article 2 of the
Mineral Code explains the relationship between the Mineral Code and the Civil
Code by providing that in the event of a conflict regarding a mineral law issue the
Mineral Code “shall prevail.” LA. REV. S TAT. ANN. § 31:2. Otherwise, the
Mineral Code is “supplementary” to the Civil Code. Id.
2. LA. REV. S TAT. ANN. § 31:9.
3. As used in this Article, the term “reservoir” has the same meaning as the
term “pool” that Louisiana law defines as “an underground reservoir containing a
common accumulation of crude petroleum oil or natural gas or both.” L A. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 30:3(6) (2007); see also LA. REV. S TAT. ANN . § 31:213(3) (2000)
(adopting same definition).
4. The best examples of common law states seeking to mimic Louisiana law
to address nagging oil and gas problems are the “Dormant Mineral” and “Mineral
Lapse” acts designed to impose a “use” requirement to perpetuate a severed
mineral interest beyond a stated statutory period. See generally Texaco, Inc. v.
Short, 454 U.S. 516 (1982) (upholding the Indiana dormant mineral act designed
to terminate a “mineral interest” if not “used” for 20 years and the owner fails to
file a statement of claim); Scully v. Overall, 840 P.2d 1211, 1214 (Kan. Ct. App.
1992) (distinguishing terms of the Kansas mineral lapse act from the Indiana act).
Title examiners across the nation are envious of Louisiana’s mineral servitude
doctrine that avoids the myriad perpetual estates in minerals that exist under the
common law system.
5. LA. REV. S TAT. ANN. § 31:9 (emphasis added).
6. See, e.g., Elliff v. Texon Drilling Co., 210 S.W.2d 558, 559 (Tex. 1948)
(negligent operations resulting in blowout and damage to the reservoir). This
concept is articulated in Article 10 of the Mineral Code: “A person with rights in
a common reservoir or deposit of minerals may not make works, operate, or
otherwise use his rights so as to deprive another intentionally or negligently of the
liberty of enjoying his rights, or that may intentionally or negligently cause
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positive rights aspects of correlative rights and how such an analysis can
assist in resolving intra-reservoir conflicts. Development of a coherent
analysis of correlative “rights and duties” in the oil and gas reservoir has
been stunted by the ad coelum doctrine and the rule of capture.
The quest for a more complete definition of property in oil and gas
begins with the foundational concepts created by the ad coelum doctrine
and the rule of capture, followed by qualifying principles created by
correlative rights and conservation regulation. The contours of correlative
rights are explored in the context of subsurface boundary disputes that
require a precise delineation of rights in oil and gas reservoirs lacking
physical boundaries. The study is completed with the author’s “reservoir
community” analysis that defines and marshals each owner’s positive and
negative correlative rights in a reservoir.
I. THE AD COELUM DOCTRINE
Much of the law of real property depends upon boundary lines drawn
upon the surface of land. Boundaries define “ownership” and the unlawful
invasion of ownership: “trespass.”7 The “ad coelum doctrine” is the
abbreviated term used to describe the extent of ownership in land within
surface boundaries.8 Ownership extends above and below the land
surface.9 The ad coelum doctrine is a foundation of land law everywhere
in the United States.10 For example, the civil law statement of the doctrine
is contained in Louisiana Civil Code article 490:
damage to him.” LA. REV. S TAT. ANN. § 31:10; see also Mobil Exploration &
Producing U.S. Inc. v. Certain Underwriters Subscribing to Cover Note 953317(A), 837 So. 2d 11, 36 (La. Ct. App. 2002) (applying Article 10 and the
comments to negligent drilling operations that resulted in a blowout and loss of
“an ownership interest in hydrocarbons to be produced from the property at
issue”).
7. Boundaries also play a similar role in defining the unlawful interference
with ownership: “nuisance.”
8. The complete maxim is: cujus est solum, ejus est usque ad coelum et ad
inferos, which is translated: “To whomsoever the soil belongs, he owns also to the
sky and to the depths.” B LACK’S LAW D ICTIONARY 341 (5th ed. 1979).
9. See supra note 8.
10. The ad coelum doctrine has been adopted, either by common law or by
statute, to draw the necessary subsurface boundary lines. For example, the
Supreme Court of Arkansas adopted it by decision in Osborn v. Arkansas
Territorial Oil & Gas Co., 146 S.W. 122, 124 (Ark. 1912). North Dakota, in 1877,
adopted the following statute: “The owner of land in fee has the right to the surface
and to everything permanently situated beneath or above it.” N.D. CENT. CODE §
47-01-12 (West, Westlaw through 2015 legislation). Professor Kuntz has
observed in his treatise: “Ownership of land carries with it ownership of or the
exclusive right to enjoy substances under the surface.” 1 EUGENE KUNTZ, A
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS 59 (1987).
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Unless otherwise provided by law, the ownership of a tract of land
carries with it the ownership of everything that is directly above
or under it.
The owner may make works on, above, or below the land as he
pleases, and draw all the advantages that accrue from them, unless
he is restrained by law or by rights of others.11
The Louisiana Mineral Code applies this doctrine to “minerals occurring
naturally in a solid state.”12
This extension of surface boundaries to define subsurface rights
operates on the same fence-line mentality used to define surface rights.13
The problem, however, is that oil and gas can move within the reservoir
rock structure and thereby migrate across the downward projection of
surface boundary lines.14 This aspect of oil and gas prompted courts to
develop the rule of capture.
II. THE RULE OF CAPTURE
In Louisiana, the rule of capture is found in article 8 of the Mineral
Code that authorizes a landowner to “reduce to possession and ownership
all of the minerals occurring naturally in a liquid or gaseous state that can
be obtained by operations on or beneath his land even though his
operations may cause their migration from beneath the land of another.”15
That is the affirmative statement of the rule. Article 14 states the negative
corollary of the rule: “A landowner has no right against another who
causes drainage of liquid or gaseous minerals from beneath his property if
the drainage results from drilling or mining operations on other lands.”16
In each case, the “land,” “property,” or “other lands” will be measured by
surface boundaries extended downward.
11. LA. C IV. C ODE art. 490 (2015).
12. LA. REV. S TAT. ANN. § 31:5 (emphasis added).
13. A description of this “fence-line mentality” follows:
Although an owner of land can construct a fence, and delineate his or her
surface boundaries, this is not possible when the line is drawn within an
oil and gas reservoir. Yet, all oil and gas conveyances and leases draw
lines that purport to neatly carve up the oil and gas reservoir. This is the
product of one of the most basic rules of property law: the owner of land
“owns” all that lies above and below the surface boundaries of the land.
David E. Pierce, Oil and Gas Easements, 33 ENERGY & M IN. L. INST. 317, 319
(2012).
14. See Frost-Johnson Lumber Co. v. Salling’s Heirs, 91 So. 207, 210–11
(La. 1922).
15. LA. REV. S TAT. ANN. § 31:8.
16. Id. § 31:14.
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Louisiana, like every other state confronting the issue, has struggled
with applying ad coelum concepts to “fugitive minerals” that have the
capacity to migrate across boundary lines within a reservoir.17 This
characteristic explains why Mineral Code article 5 applies traditional ad
coelum principles to “solid minerals”18 while article 6 states: “Ownership
of land does not include ownership of oil, gas, and other minerals
occurring naturally in liquid or gaseous form . . . .”19 Whether oil and gas
rights are part of the “[o]wnership of land” or a right to enter land to
explore, develop, and produce oil and gas does not matter.20 In either case
the right to search for, extract, and own the oil, gas, or other minerals, is
defined by what takes place on a tract of land that is described by surface
boundaries.21 The court in Alphonzo E. Bell Corp. v. Bell View Oil
Syndicate described the role of boundaries under the non-ownership-inplace theory noting that it granted the exclusive right to seek and capture
oil and gas “that may be found within the exterior lines of his surface
premises extended vertically downward.”22
The ad coelum doctrine and rule of capture create what appear to be
absolute and therefore seemingly conflicting property rights. To understand
the full contours of oil and gas ownership, it is necessary to consider each
reservoir owner’s correlative rights and rights created by conservation
regulation.

17. This conceptual struggle apparently began in 1897 with the Ohio
Supreme Court’s holding in Kelly v. Ohio Oil Co., 49 N.E. 399 (Ohio 1897),
where the court applied a rule of capture to gas migrating from adjacent lands
owned by others. See T ERENCE D AINTITH, F INDERS KEEPERS? HOW THE LAW
OF C APTURE SHAPED THE W ORLD O IL I NDUSTRY 28–29 (2010).
18. LA. REV. S TAT. ANN. § 31:5.
19. Id. § 31:6.
20. The second sentence in article 6 provides: “The landowner has the
exclusive right to explore and develop his property for the production of such
minerals and to reduce them to possession and ownership.” Id.
21. The critical event where a mineral in the land becomes a separate item of
property is when it is reduced to “possession” which occurs “when they are under
physical control that permits delivery to another.” Id. § 31:7. The comment to
article 7 notes the point of “possession” for oil and gas has been recognized as
being when they are extracted at the wellhead. Id. cmt. The common law
recognizes that oil and gas cannot be sold as “goods” until they have been
extracted and are available for sale. U.C.C. § 2-107(1) (2012). The UCC article
does not say that the oil and gas are not “goods.” It says that they cannot be sold
as goods until there is severance by the seller; otherwise a contract is merely an
agreement to sell. Id.
22. 76 P.2d 167, 179 (Cal. Ct. App. 1938).
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III. CONSERVATION REGULATION AND CORRELATIVE RIGHTS
Louisiana was quick to take action to respond to waste created by the
rule of capture and the resulting damage to correlative rights. For example,
when a gas well in Caddo Parish got out of control, caught fire, and burned
for several months, the spectacle became a train destination for tourists
from Shreveport, including the Governor of Louisiana.23 The well burned
from May 7, 1905 through November 17, 1905.24 In 1906 the legislature
promptly passed an act that criminalized allowing a gas well to remain out
of control or wasting gas by allowing it to burn or vent into the air.25 In
1960, Dean Sullivan, after studying the first 50 years of conservation
experience in Louisiana, commented:
Louisiana has a reputation for militant conservation of oil and gas.
Problems that would be complex by the standards of many oil
producing states have become routine. Judicial interpretation of
the conservation laws and of administrative action thereunder
reflects the appreciation of individual rights and of the necessity
for the conservation of these irreplaceable natural resources.26
As noted by Dean Sullivan, Louisiana has always been at the forefront of
addressing difficult oil and gas ownership and development issues.
Because conservation regulation often involves limitations on the rule
of capture, “correlative rights” are often discussed in tandem with
conservation issues. To a large extent, an owner is left to his or her own
devices under the rule of capture to secure and protect correlative rights.
As Professors Kramer and Martin note in their treatise on pooling and
unitization:
Having correlative rights in a common source of supply does not
mean that each owner is guaranteed to recover a proportionate share
of the oil or gas in the reservoir, but only that each owner shall be
afforded the opportunity to produce or to share in production on a
reasonable and fair basis. The point bears repeating for emphasis:

23. Yandell Boatner, Legal History of Conservation of Oil and Gas in
Louisiana, in LEGAL H ISTORY OF CONSERVATION OF O IL AND G AS 60, 61 n.3
(1939).
24. Id.
25. Id. at 61.
26. CONSERVATION OF O IL & G AS 100 (Robert E. Sullivan ed., 1960).
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The correlative right is having the opportunity to produce, not having
a guaranteed share of production.27
When a conservation authority limits an owner’s self-help capture
remedy—the “opportunity”—it must do so in a fair and equitable manner.
A failure to do so would violate the owner’s correlative rights.
A number of cases demonstrate how these correlative rights may be
violated by limiting an owner’s opportunity to produce. For example, in
Zinke & Trumbo, Ltd. v. State Corp. Commission of the State of Kansas,28
the court held that the commission violated Zinke’s correlative rights by
failing to consider a statutory factor in adopting a proration formula for
gas wells in a reservoir, the “Morrow sand,” that the commission
regulated.29 Sho-Bar completed a well with 11 feet of productive reservoir
thickness located 330 feet from Zinke’s lease line.30 Zinke had completed
a well on its lease with 30 feet of productive reservoir.31 Sho-Bar fraced
its well; the court commented on the trajectory of the frac stating:
Experts for both parties testified a fracture of this size would
extend at least 400 feet in the area of least resistance. The center
of the reservoir on Zinke’s lease is the area of least resistance.
Since Sho–Bar’s location of Fincham 1–30 is only 330 feet from
Zinke’s lease line, the fracture obviously penetrated Zinke’s
lease.32
After the frac treatment, production from Sho-Bar’s well increased by
over 550%.33 This dramatic increase was attributed to the highly porous
and permeable nature of the reservoir and the frac traveling from the edge
of the formation, where Sho-Bar’s well was located, to the heart of the
formation, where Zinke’s well was located.34
When Sho-Bar applied to the Kansas Corporation Commission to
establish field rules for the Morrow sand, Sho-Bar proposed 160-acre
spacing with a 50–50 proration formula: 50% of the total pool allowable
based upon the open flow of each well and 50% based upon the acreage
attributable to each well.35 Zinke objected, arguing for 640-acre spacing
27. 1 BRUCE M. KRAMER & P ATRICK H. M ARTIN, T HE LAW OF P OOLING
UNITIZATION § 5-01, at 5-16 (2014).
28. 749 P.2d 21 (Kan. 1988).
29. Id. at 28.
30. Id. at 23.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 27.
33. Id. (Flow increased from 4.5 million cubic feet per day to 25 million).
34. Id. at 23, 27.
35. Id. at 23–24.

AND
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and a formula that was not so heavily weighted toward the open flow of
Sho-Bar’s fraced well.36 The Commission adopted Sho-Bar’s 160-acre
spacing and the 50–50 proration formula.37
On appeal, the court first noted that the Commission had the duty to
protect each party’s correlative rights, which include allowing each owner
to produce from a reservoir in a manner that will not: “(A) injure the
reservoir to the detriment of others; (B) take an undue proportion of the
obtainable oil or gas; (C) or cause undue drainage between developed
leases.”38 The applicable conservation statute required the Commission to
“give equitable consideration to acreage, pressure, open flow, porosity,
permeability and thickness of pay, and such other factors, conditions and
circumstances as may exist in the common source of supply under
consideration at the time, as may be pertinent.”39 Zinke contended the
Commission erred by not considering the impact of the fracture treatment
as an “other factor” in developing field rules for the Morrow formation.
The court agreed and held that the order was unreasonable and a violation
of Zinke’s correlative rights.40
The Zinke case is an example of correlative rights in a public context
designed to ensure fair treatment by government when it intervenes to
marshal capture rights. The issue is routine and one that commissions,
commissioners, and courts have dealt with extensively.41 Much less
36. Id. at 24. Zinke proposed an allowable formula determined by “dividing
the net acre feet attributable to each well by the total reservoir acre feet.” Id. at
26–27.
37. Id. at 24.
38. Id.; see also KAN. ADMIN. REGS. § 82-3-101(a)(21)(A)–(C) (Supp.
2014).
39. Zinke, 749 P.2d at 24 (emphasis added) (citing K AN. S TAT. ANN. § 55703(a) (1986)).
40. The court found:
Under the KCC’s duty to protect correlative rights to natural gas in a
common source of supply, we find evidence of fracture treatment to a
well or wells in the common field to be one of the “other factors,
conditions, and circumstances” which must be considered in making a
proration order. It is particularly important where a well’s open flow is
50% of its allowable production. The BPO [basic proration order] does
not reveal, nor do we find, that the fracture treatment to Sho–Bar’s
Fincham 1–30 well was considered by the KCC in making its BPO. We
hold the order is thus unreasonable.
Zinke, 749 P.2d at 28.
41. The Commission’s error in the Zinke case was not necessarily the ultimate
formula it chose to adopt; it was the failure to consider the statutory factors in
arriving at its decision. For example, in Mobil Oil Corp. v. Gill, 194 So. 2d 351,
353–54 (La. Ct. App. 1966), the Commissioner of Conservation adopted a
participation formula in a reservoir-wide unit giving 60% weight to productive
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developed is the private context of correlative rights. The cases that follow
are examples of courts resolving disputes that could have been better
addressed using a correlative rights analysis. Instead, the issues were
forced into an ill-fitting “property line” analysis.
IV. INTRA-RESERVOIR CONFLICTS AND THE
“PROPERTY LINE” ANALYSIS
To date, conflicts among owners within an oil and gas reservoir have
been framed using an ad coelom or rule of capture analysis, which is
essentially a “property line” analysis. The most notable recent intrareservoir disputes have concerned hydraulic fracturing where frac fissures
cross a subterranean boundary line. The Texas Supreme Court, in Coastal
Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza Energy Trust,42 found no “actionable” trespass
when a frac fissure extended into adjacent lands.43 The federal district
court, applying West Virginia law in Stone v. Chesapeake Appalachia,
LLC,44 considered and rejected the analysis in Garza and held that frac
fissures extending into adjacent lands constituted an actionable trespass.45
Commenting on the Texas Supreme Court’s analysis, the court in Stone
stated: “The Garza opinion gives oil and gas operators a blank check to
steal from the small landowner.”46 Both cases applied a property line
analysis.

sand under a tract; Mobil contended it should be a 100% weighting. In the Gill
case, Mobil was complaining because the Commissioner considered other factors,
authorized by statute, to determine “each producer’s just and equitable share.” Id.
at 354 (internal quotation marks omitted). The court affirmed the Commissioner’s
decision. Id. at 355.
42. 268 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2008).
43. Although the Supreme Court found no actionable trespass, the trial court
and court of appeals did, and the court of appeals affirmed damages of $543,776
and punitive damages of $10,000,000. Mission Res., Inc. v. Garza Energy Trust,
166 S.W.3d 301, 309–10 (Tex. App. 2005), rev’d sub nom., Coastal Oil & Gas
Corp. v. Garza Energy Trust, 268 S.W.3d 1 (Tex 2008). The court of appeals
affirmed the jury finding of malice, concluding the record established “Coastal’s
specific intent to cause substantial injury to appellees” by engaging in hydraulic
fracturing to increase production from Coastal’s wells. Id. at 314–15. The court
of appeals also found the Texas statutory cap on punitive damages was properly
removed because the record supported a finding that Coastal’s hydraulic
fracturing activities constituted felony theft. Id. at 315–16.
44. No. 5:12-CV-102, 2013 WL 2097397 (N.D. W. Va. Apr. 10, 2013),
vacated following settlement, 2013 WL 7863861 (N.D. W. Va. July 30, 2013).
45. Id. at *8.
46. Id. at *6.
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A. Garza: A Weak and Incorrect Analysis
In Garza, the majority of the court held that addressing the inherent
legitimacy of the frac fissure crossing boundary lines was unnecessary
because the lessor, lacking a present possessory interest in the impacted
land,47 could not seek damages for anything other than the loss of oil and
gas through drainage.48 The court then made the analytical leap that any
damages associated with drainage were foreclosed by the rule of capture.49
The weakness of the analysis in Garza is that the court never evaluated
the legitimacy of the activity that made capturing the oil and gas possible.50
The predicate for being able to capture the oil and gas was the act of
fracing the well. If the fracing was a legitimate act, then the drainage from
the adjacent land would be protected by the rule of capture. If the fracing
was illegitimate, the subsequent capture would also be illegitimate.
Although Garza is hailed by many as “solving” the trespass problems
relating to fracing,51 the court clearly indicated it was not addressing the
issue.52 After noting its withdrawn opinion in Geo Viking, Inc v. Tex-Lee
Operating Co.,53 where the court had held “fracing beneath another’s land
was a trespass,” the court stated that it “need not decide the broader issue
here.”54 Instead, the court held that any damages the plaintiffs could assert

47. Under Texas law, the oil and gas lease created a fee simple determinable
conveyance of the oil and gas by the lessor to the lessee. Garza, 268 S.W.3d at 9.
Therefore, while the lease was in effect, the lessor owned a nonpossessory
possibility of reverter in the oil and gas. Id. This limited the lessor to only those
remedies available to owners of nonpossessory interests. Id.
48. Id. at 12.
49. See David E. Pierce, Carol Rose Comes to the Oil Patch: Modern
Property Analysis Applied to Modern Reservoir Problems, 19 PENN ST. ENVTL.
L. REV. 241, 260–61 (2011).
50. This was the principal complaint of the dissenting justices: “I would not
address whether the rule of capture precludes damages when oil and gas is
produced through hydraulic fractures that extend across lease lines until it is
determined whether hydraulically fracturing across lease lines is a trespass.”
Garza, 268 S.W.3d at 42 (Johnson, J., dissenting). The dissenting justices make
the point that only legitimate capture is protected by the rule of capture. To
determine whether Coastal’s capture was legitimate, the analysis must first
address the legitimacy of the frac fissures crossing property lines. Id. at 43–44.
51. This general assumption is best demonstrated by the argument made by
the defendants in Stone. Stone v. Chesapeake Appalachia, LLC, No. 5:12-CV102, 2013 WL 2097397, at *4 (N.D. W. Va. Apr. 10, 2013), vacated following
settlement, 2013 WL 7863861 (N.D. W. Va. July 30, 2013).
52. Garza, 268 S.W.3d at 12.
53. No. D-1678, 1992 WL 80263 (Tex. 1992) (per curiam), withdrawn, 839
S.W.2d 797 (Tex. 1992) (per curiam).
54. Garza, 268 S.W.3d at 12.
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were related solely to drainage, which the majority deemed to be
encompassed by the rule of capture.55
B. Stone: A Strong but Equally Incorrect Analysis
The court in Stone uses a strict property line analysis to impose
liability when a frac fissure crossed a surface boundary extended
downward into the reservoir.56 The court did not attempt to consider the
nature of each tract owner’s rights in the connected reservoir structure.57
Correlative rights were not considered.58
The problem with the analysis in Stone is the court assumed that when
a frac fissure crossed a subterranean boundary line it constituted a
trespass.59 Stone clearly answered the question left unanswered in Garza:
recovery of oil and gas through a frac fissure that crosses property lines is
a trespass and is therefore not protected by the rule of capture.60 The court
stated its belief that the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals would
find: “that hydraulic fracturing under the land of a neighboring property
without that party’s consent is not protected by the ‘rule of capture,’ but
rather constitutes an actionable trespass.”61
The court noted that West Virginia fully embraces the ad coleum
doctrine.62 The court used this reasoning to try and distinguish Garza
because the Texas Supreme Court suggested the doctrine may not be
applied to a subsurface trespass.63 The ad coelum doctrine is a necessary
55. Id. “Accordingly, we hold that damages for drainage by hydraulic
fracturing are precluded by the rule of capture.” Id. at 17.
56. Stone, 2013 WL 2097397, at *7–*8.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at *8.
60. Id.
61. Id. The Stone analysis, like the Garza analysis, fails to consider the
connected nature of the property interest at issue. Neither opinion contains any
analysis regarding the parties’ correlative rights in the reservoir. The observations
made by Theresa Poindexter, in her student comment on Garza, are therefore
equally applicable to Stone. Theresa D. Poindexter, Comment, Correlative Rights
Doctrine, Not the Rule of Capture, Provides Correct Analysis for Resolving
Hydraulic Fracturing Cases [Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza Energy Trust, 268
S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2008)], 48 W ASHBURN L.J. 755, 756–57 (2009).
62. Stone, 2013 WL 2097397, at *7. The court observed: “Significantly, the
West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals as recently as 2003 reaffirmed the
maxim, stating that ‘we are considering the case of a lessor who owned from the
heavens to the center of the earth.’” Id.
63. The Texas Supreme Court, after noting Lord Coke could not have
envisioned airplanes or oil wells, stated: “The law of trespass need no more be the
same two miles below the surface than two miles above.” Garza, 268 S.W.3d at
11. This statement was dicta. The court was musing that if frac fissures constituted
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component of the property line analysis. Once a frac fissure crosses a
property line, a trespass has been committed, and any drainage of oil and
gas associated with the frac will be illegitimate and not protected by the
rule of capture.64
As is frequently the case, the court chose to protect the landowner’s
right to refuse to pool its land or otherwise participate in development of
the reservoir—the right to just say “no.” The Stone court emphatically
made this point when it stated:
The Garza opinion gives oil and gas operators a blank check to
steal from the small landowner. Under such a rule, the companies
may tell a small landowner that either they sign a lease on the
company’s terms or the company will just hydraulicly [sic]
fracture under the property and take the oil and gas without
compensation. In the alternative, a company may just take the gas
without even contacting a small landowner.65
In many states, as in Louisiana, compulsory pooling statutes have
severely limited the landowner’s ability to just say “no.”66 In a state like
Kansas, which has no compulsory pooling, the landowner has the right to
say “no,” but in that process, the landowner may also be saying no to the
opportunity to recover the oil and gas beneath the land.67

a trespass under the ad coelum doctrine, the court may be forced to consider, or
reconsider, the nature of subsurface ownership. The court has subsequently
indicated that different rules can be applied to subsurface invasions that do not
relate to the recovery of oil and gas. FPL Farming Ltd. v. Envtl. Processing Sys.,
L.C., 351 S.W.3d 306, 314 (Tex. 2011) (wastewater injection well).
64. Stone, 2013 WL 2097397, at *7–8.
65. Id. at *6.
66. In Nunez v. Wainoco Oil & Gas Co., the court held that:
[W]hen the Commissioner of Conservation has declared that landowners
share a common interest in a reservoir of natural resources beneath their
adjacent tracts, such common interest does not permit one participant to
rely on a concept of individual ownership to thwart the common right to
the resource as well as the important state interest in developing its
resources fully and efficiently.
488 So. 2d 955, 964 (La. 1986) (emphasis added).
67. In Mobil Oil Corp. v. State Corp. Commission, 608 P.2d 1325 (Kan.
1980), the court held that although the owner of an undivided 3/7 of the mineral
interest refused to join in development, the remaining 4/7 interest may
nevertheless be considered in assigning an allowable to a voluntarily pooled unit.
Because the unit well was not located on the tract at issue, the owner of the 3/7
interest would not participate in production attributable to the tract. In contrast to
the “small landowner” situation described by the court in Stone, the Kansas
Supreme Court viewed the “small landowner” and Mobil as follows:
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The court in Stone made clear that the rule of capture does not protect
hydraulic fracturing.68 But whether fracing might be protected under a
more precise definition of the parties’ respective rights as members of a
“reservoir neighborhood” was an issue left untouched.
V. THE RESERVOIR “NEIGHBORHOOD” ANALYSIS
Article 667 of the Louisiana Civil Code provides, in part: “Although
a proprietor may do with his estate whatever he pleases, still he cannot
make any work on it, which may deprive his neighbor of the liberty of
enjoying his own, or which may be the cause of any damage to him.”69
This portion of article 667 recognizes that no property interest is absolute.
Private property is sometimes made more valuable by recognizing limits
on its free use because the property will benefit from similar limits
imposed on surrounding owners. Even the ad coelum doctrine can be
“restrained by law or by rights of others.”70 Carol Rose, one of the leading
contemporary property theorists, has noted that property consists of “some
individual rights, mixed with some rights shared with nearby associates or
neighbors, mixed with still more rights shared with a larger community,
all held in relatively stable but nevertheless changing and subtly
renegotiated relationships.”71 One can apply Professor Rose’s theories to
oil and gas development.72 When dealing with oil and gas in a reservoir,
these reciprocal limitations—and corresponding reciprocal rights—are
reflected in the concept of correlative rights.

The rather dog-in-the-manger position of the owners of the 3/7 interest
is that if Mobil won’t pay them a premium for joining the unit then it is
unfair to let the owners of the 4/7 interest into the unit. The Commission,
by its order, permits the 3/7 to use the 4/7 as a tool to improve their
bargaining position.
Id. at 1337.
68. Stone, 2013 WL 2097397, at *8.
69. LA. C IV. CODE. art. 667 (2015). Article 10 of the Mineral Code applies
the Article 667 concepts to the oil and gas reservoir. See supra notes 1, 6.
70. LA. C IV. CODE art. 490. Article 490, after stating that “a tract of land
carries with it the ownership of everything that is directly above or under it,”
tempers this ownership by providing: “The owner may make works on, above, or
below the land as he pleases, and draw all the advantages that accrue from them,
unless he is restrained by law or by rights of others.” Id. (emphasis added).
71. Carol M. Rose, Canons of Property Talk, or, Blackstone’s Anxiety, 108
Y ALE L.J. 601, 631 (1998).
72. Pierce, supra note 49, at 245.
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A. Correlative Rights
During the formative years of oil and gas law, the greatest threat to the
rule of capture was the correlative rights doctrine. The concern was that
the doctrine might be used to allocate a specific volume of oil and gas to
individual tracts of land overlying the reservoir.
1. Negative Rights and Fear of “Fair Share” Allocation
In 1931, the American Petroleum Institute (“API”) sought to describe
each owner’s correlative rights in a reservoir by stating: “‘each owner of
the surface is entitled only to his equitable and ratable share of the
recoverable oil and gas energy in the common pool in the proportion which
the recoverable reserves underlying his land bear to the recoverable
reserves in the pool.’”73 If this principle were applied literally, then a
producer would have to stop producing once it had recovered its “equitable
and ratable share of the recoverable oil and gas” from the reservoir. Any
attempt to allocate a specific portion of a reservoir to overlying landowners
would severely limit the rule of capture and the entrepreneurial spirit that
rule inspires. Perhaps that is why the API, in 1942, purported to “clarify”
its 1931 statement with the following:
Within reasonable limits, each operator should have an opportunity
equal to that afforded other operators to recover the equivalent of
the amount of recoverable oil [and gas] underlying his property.
The aim should be to prevent reasonably avoidable drainage of oil
and gas across property lines that is not offset by counter
drainage.74
Through this clarification, the API fundamentally changed its statement
on correlative rights by focusing on a fair “opportunity” to exercise capture

73. AM. INST. MINING & METALLURGICAL ENG’RS, PETROLEUM CONSERVATION
256 (Stuart E. Buckley ed., 1951) (quoting AM. PETROLEUM INST., PROCEEDINGS OF
THE TWELFTH ANNUAL MEETING § 1 (1930)); see also Seldon B. Graham, Jr., Fair
Share or Fair Game? Great Principle, Good Technology—But Pitfalls in
Practice, 8 NAT. RESOURCES LAW. 61, 65 (1975).
74. SPECIAL S TUDY COMM. & LEGAL ADVISORY COMM. ON W ELL
SPACING & ALLOCATION OF P ROD., AM. P ETROLEUM INST., P ROGRESS
REPORT ON S TANDARDS OF ALLOCATION OF O IL P RODUCTION W ITHIN P OOLS
AND AMONG P OOLS 8 (1942) (emphasis added); see also Wronski v. Sun Oil Co.,
279 N.W.2d 564, 569–70 (Mich. Ct. App. 1979).
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rights as opposed to any attempt to allocate oil and gas to overlying
property owners.75
By the time this change in policy was announced, states were passing
oil and gas conservation laws and the focus shifted from private correlative
rights to ensuring equal treatment of owners by conservation agencies
regulating drilling and production.76 The only private correlative rights
issues were those dealing with injury to the reservoir that impaired the
capture rights of other owners in the reservoir. Prior to the conservation
movement, most correlative rights cases related to injury inflicted on other
owners in the reservoir.77 One notable exception is Hague v. Wheeler,78
which many commentators cite as an outright rejection of correlative
rights in favor of unrestrained capture.79 As will be seen, however, Hague
was probably the first “gas balancing” case, with the result driven by the
court’s search for an equitable remedy.
2. The First Gas Balancing Case: Hague v. Wheeler
The court in Hague v. Wheeler was attempting to deal with one
developer’s refusal to share a market for gas with another developer in the
same reservoir.80 As the court noted: “it is a matter of first importance to
get a clear apprehension of the facts . . . .”81 Wheeler undertook to drill the
well “at the suggestion and request of the gas company . . . .”82 Hague was
another operator in the field who was selling gas to the gas company.83
After drilling a well, Wheeler and the gas company were unable to agree
75. This is also the modern definition of correlative rights. See KRAMER &
MARTIN, supra note 27, § 5-01, at 5-16.
76. The API’s initial 1931 characterization of correlative rights was immediately
followed by the enactment of state oil and gas conservation statutes. See generally
THE OIL AND GAS CONSERVATION STATUTES [annotated] (Northcutt Ely comp.
1933).
77. See, e.g., Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana, 177 U.S. 190, 209–10 (1900) (oil
producer enjoined from producing in a manner that would injure gas producers in
same reservoir).
78. 27 A. 714 (Pa. 1893).
79. D AINTITH, supra note 17, at 27–28 (“The court . . . explicitly rejected any
restriction of the defendants’ rights derived from ideas of malice or correlative
rights in a common resource, which had been adopted—from the developing law
of subterranean waters—in a learned judgment by the court below.”); Bruce M.
Kramer & Owen L. Anderson, The Rule of Capture—An Oil and Gas Perspective,
35 ENVTL. L. 899, 907 (2005) (describing Hague as a “‘pure’ form of the rule of
capture”).
80. Hague, 27 A. at 718–19.
81. Id. at 718.
82. Id.
83. Id.
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on a gas sales arrangement.84 In the meantime, Hague and the gas company
were producing and marketing gas from their wells.85 Wheeler’s response
was to open his well and let the gas vent into the air.86 After making several
insightful observations about “correlative rights,” the trial court granted
the injunction sought by Hague and the gas company.87
The trial judge considered correlative rights limitations recognized
under water law and commented on “certain duties of good neighborhood”
that were applicable to the oil and gas reservoir.88 The court posed the
following questions regarding the connected nature of the oil and gas
reservoir: “What, then, are the rights of adjoining owners of oil and gas?
Are they absolute and independent, or qualified and correlative?”89
Answering the question, the court held that the “right of each owner is
qualified” because of the connected nature of the right; each must “submit
to such limitations as are inevitable to enable each to get his own.”90
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court took a much more pragmatic
approach to the issues. If the court upheld the injunction, there would be
no incentive for Hague and the gas company to share their markets with
Wheeler, and Wheeler’s gas would be drained away.91 If the injunction
were denied, a chance would remain that Wheeler could make a deal to
sell his gas, or his gas well, to Hague or the gas company. The issue was
whether to uphold the trial court’s injunction. In reversing the injunction,
the court did not think that accomplishing equity was necessary in this
case.92 The court even ended its opinion with a statement acknowledging
that an oil and gas developer “must not disregard his obligations to the
public, he must not disregard his neighbor’s rights.”93 This ruling was not
an outright rejection of correlative rights in oil and gas, but merely a
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 717. In Higgins Oil & Fuel Co. v. Guaranty Oil Co., 82 So. 2d 206
(La. 1919), leaving a well unplugged such that it impaired the ability of an
adjacent landowner to efficiently operate their pump was held to be actionable.
The court noted that one “must not in an unneighborly spirit do that which while
of no benefit to himself causes damage to the neighbor.” Id. at 211; see also Mobil
Exploration & Producing U.S. Inc. v. Certain Underwriters Subscribing to Cover
Note 95-3317(A), 837 So. 2d 11, 36–39 (La. Ct. App. 2002) (applying article 10
of the Mineral Code to allow recovery of damages to the oil and gas reservoir
neighborhood caused by negligent drilling operations resulting in a blowout).
88. Hague, 27 A. at 716.
89. Id. at 717.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 719 (“Their well must be shut in, while their successful neighbors
drain the entire basin through their open wells, and receive pay for the gas.”).
92. Id.
93. Id. at 720.
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refusal to use the concept to limit Wheeler’s rights as to Hague and the gas
company.94
B. Professor Kuntz’s “Special Community”
Professor Kuntz first described correlative rights as rules for a “special
community” in a 1958 article for the Mississippi Law Journal.95 In
summarizing the scope of the term “correlative rights,” Professor Kuntz
observed: “It is a simple doctrine that owners of rights in a common source
of supply may not inflict loss upon one another by conduct which is
considered to be socially undesirable.”96 This statement concerns the
negative rights component of correlative rights and declares what cannot
be done in the reservoir. He then develops the “social” aspects of
correlative rights, stating:
The owners in the common source of supply operate in a special
community, and the social acceptability of conduct within such
community must be determined, not only by applying the standards
applicable to conduct generally, but by also considering the utility
of the conduct in the light of its peculiar consequence to others
operating in the same community.97
Although this passage suggests that Professor Kuntz would recognize a
positive rights component to correlative rights, he does not further develop
his special community observation. In his treatise, Professor Kuntz expands
upon his analysis of correlative rights, mentioning “fracturing the sands” as
being in a category where the rule of capture protects correlative rights by
allowing impacted owners to “do likewise.”98 He contrasts that situation
with secondary recovery operations “because it is not always possible for
each operator to ‘go and do likewise’ and thereby obtain his fair share of the
common source of supply.”99 The “reservoir community” analysis builds on
Professor Kuntz’s special community but also provides a foundation for a
positive rights component to correlative rights.

94. See id. at 718–20.
95. Eugene Kuntz, Correlative Rights in Oil and Gas, 30 MISS. L.J. 1, 8
(1958).
96. Id.
97. Id. This “special community” analysis is also repeated by Professor Kuntz
in his treatise. K UNTZ, supra note 10, at 120.
98. Id. at 129.
99. Id.
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C. A “Reservoir Community” Analysis
The foundation of a reservoir community analysis is the physical
reality that drawing a property line within a reservoir and thereby creating
a segregated portion of reservoir ownership is not possible. This reality is
also the inherent flaw with the ad coelum doctrine, the rule of capture, and
the resulting property line analysis. What the courts failed to realize in
Garza and Stone is the undeniable fact that neither party to the litigation
had the sole rights to the reservoirs at issue. In each case, the parties owned
more, and less, than the courts accounted for in their analyses. They each
owned more rights because they also possessed rights in the reservoir at
large, which gave them rights in the properties of their neighbors. They each
owned less rights because the portions of the reservoir within their property
lines were connected to surrounding properties. Because activities within
the owner’s property lines could impact surrounding properties, the owner
will be restrained to account for community rights.
1. Define Community Membership
The reservoir community analysis begins where the property line
analysis begins and ends—with surface boundaries. The surface boundaries
define membership in the reservoir community. Membership may change
as more information concerning the extent of the reservoir becomes
available. The extent of the reservoir defines the universe of potential
members and ownership lines drawn at the surface will determine those
members.
Using the Garza case as a guide, assume the reservoir at issue—the
community—is the Vicksburg T formation, which is found at a depth
between 11,688 and 12,610 feet below the surface of lands that constitute
the reservoir community.100 Although property lines will be used to define
membership in a particular reservoir community, they will not define
rights as a community member.101
2. Define the Physical Attributes of the Reservoir Community
The second step is to identify the physical attributes of the reservoir
community. The Vicksburg T formation described in Garza is a gas

100. Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza Energy Trust, 268 S.W.3d 1, 5 (Tex
2008).
101. See David E. Pierce, Developing a Common Law of Hydraulic
Fracturing, 72 U. P ITT. L. REV. 685, 693 (2011).
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reservoir located at the depths noted previously.102 “The Vicksburg T is a
‘tight’ sandstone formation, relatively imporous and impermeable, from
which natural gas cannot be commercially produced without hydraulic
fracturing stimulation . . . .”103 Depending upon the conduct being evaluated,
extensive geological and geophysical information may be collected for
consideration. The goal is to figure out how the reservoir community
works.
3. Evaluate the Activity Impacting the Reservoir Community
Once the mechanics of the reservoir community are fully understood,
a developer’s proposed activity—and its impact on the reservoir
community—can be properly evaluated. The activity for this example is
the hydraulic fracturing conducted by Coastal in the Vicksburg T
formation. The first issue is whether any hydraulic fracturing should be
allowed in the Vicksburg T formation. Assume a landowner owning oil
and gas rights in the Vicksburg T formation objects to all hydraulic
fracturing. Perhaps they are concerned about frac fissures coming onto
their part of the formation from adjacent lands. Perhaps they fear
producing additional fossil fuels will contribute to climate change and the
ultimate destruction of planet Earth. The matter will not be put to a vote.
Instead, consideration of the physical attributes of the Vicksburg T
formation will provide the answer. Because the Vicksburg T is worthless
without hydraulic fracturing, it is an appropriate activity and one that
should be encouraged.104
But what if prudent development of the Vicksburg T formation
requires that frac fissures extend across property lines?105 Can an owner
object to the practice? Unlike the ad coelum capture property line analysis,
the issue is not the proximity of a frac fissure to a property line. The issue
is whether the conduct is in harmony with development of the reservoir
community. The proper focus should be on the conduct: the justification
102. Garza, 268 S.W.3d at 5.
103. Id. at 6.
104. The analysis should consider only what is necessary to maximize
development and value from the Vicksburg T formation. Surface use and other
collateral issues should not enter into the analysis. This is purely an exercise for
the technicians seeking to get the most value out of an oil and gas reservoir.
105. This may be done to avoid creating bands of reservoir that are not
appropriately developed and therefore leave oil and gas unrecovered and, in many
cases, unrecoverable. Potential trespass liability would most likely cause these
bands of otherwise productive reservoir to become wider as developers, and their
lawyers, seek to manage the risk of trespass claims. This injects an artificial
component into the development process that has no relationship to the best
interests of the reservoir community, or the general public.
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for what was done, how it was done, and its impact on the reservoir
community. The impact will be a matter of time and place; the state of the
art combined with the special requirements of the reservoir.106
This step is where the positive aspects of correlative rights play a major
role in the analysis. When fracing is consistent with reservoir community
standards, owners will have the affirmative right to send frac fissures across
property lines and into adjacent lands. When properly viewed as a property
right of a common owner in the reservoir community, trespass will not be
an issue. The intrusion across property lines is authorized as a member of
the reservoir community pursuing development of the reservoir.
Therefore, when a court must evaluate the legitimacy of frac fissures
that cross property lines, courts should not consider the concept of “trespass”
until the property interests of all parties have been accurately defined.
Trespass will always be dependent upon an accurate definition of the
affected parties’ property rights. The reservoir community analysis
recognizes communal rights in the reservoir that will often extend beyond
property lines. The issue can also arise before a state oil and gas
conservation commission, regarding spacing and set-backs from adjacent
properties. The communal rights of all parties in the reservoir must likewise
be acknowledged to prevent adopting development rules that create
unnecessary buffer zones for no reason other than to accommodate property
lines. Buffer zones can strand oil and gas reserves resulting in waste.
Properly defining each owner’s property interest in the reservoir community
will secure the rights of all owners and promote efficient development of the
oil and gas resource.
CONCLUSION
Whether termed correlative rights, reservoir community, or
subterranean neighborhood, the goal is to ensure that oil and gas ownership
is viewed in its proper multi-dimensional context. Each owner within a
reservoir is “connected” to varying degrees with other owners in the
reservoir. This connection places restrictions on all owners to not do things
106. As noted in previous writings:
The “time” element considers the state of the art in developing oil and
gas. The “place” encompasses the unique conditions presented by a
particular reservoir. . . . Development techniques and practices that were
reasonable at one time may become unreasonable as they are eclipsed by
new techniques and practices. Therefore, the correlative rights within a
particular reservoir community must be evaluated on a case-by-case
basis.
Pierce, supra note 49, at 259.
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in the reservoir that could injure the reservoir community. At the same time,
that connection gives each owner affirmative rights that can extend into the
community to such an extent that property lines may not be the limitation
encountered at the surface. Hydraulic fracturing is a good example. Because
developers must operate in an interconnected reservoir, allowing frac
fissures to venture beyond property lines to achieve effective development
of the reservoir community will often be reasonable. When the activity is
appropriate to meet the needs of the reservoir community, fracing becomes
one of the developer’s correlative rights.

